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ARGUMENT 
Defendants admission, "Defendants agree with the majority of Plaintiffs' 
'Statement of the Case,'" is no small admission. For therein the defendants admit, of 
course, that the plaintiffs have suffered an injury for which the defendants are potentially 
liable, but defendants also freely admit that plaintiffs filed a notice of claim within five 
months of the accident, that the notices of claim were sent to and received by the county 
clerk's office, that Holly Ramsay of the county clerk's office signed for the notices, that a 
Kane County Commissioner called plaintiffs counsel in regards to the claims, that Ms. 
Hutton, the attorney representing Kane County on this claim acknowledged her 
possession of the claims and requested further information, and that Kane County 
Attorney, Mr. Winchester, identified Ms. Hutton as the proper party to whom all 
information should be sent. Nevertheless, the defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims 
should be summarily defeated. 
The defendants admit to plaintiffs' statement of the case expressly with only one 
real exception. Apparently, defendants wish to dispute that the notice of claim was 
delivered to the Kane County Court Clerk, although in its brief, defendant admits that the 
notice was received by the employees of the county clerks office. See plaintiffs' brief at 
page 6. Defendants do not dispute that the same person, Holly Ramsay, who provided the 
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only affidavit in support of defendants' motion to dismiss which states that she is an 
employee of the county clerk's office, is the same person who signed for the receipt of the 
notices of claim. Therefore, the notice was in fact delivered to the county clerk's office. 
The real dispute in this matter is the effect of plaintiffs' failure to "direct" the notice to 
the county clerk, so far as that term is construed to mean that the notice must bear the 
clerk's name, since there is no real dispute that the notices were sent to the address of the 
county clerk. 
Because the facts and circumstances of this case present a scenario where the 
purposes of the notice statute have been fully met, and circumstances exist upon which 
the plaintiffs reasonably relied that they had fulfilled the notice requirements, the trial 
court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss must be reversed. 
L PLAINTIFFS9 NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS SUFFICIENT 
Defendants allege that plaintiffs' failure to "direct" the notice to the county clerk 
renders the notice fatally defective. Defendants' analysis ignores two salient facts. First, 
to accept defendants analysis this court must hold that unless the county clerk's name is 
found on the notice, the notice is defective. In this case the notice was addressed to the 
office where the county clerk is found. In this sense the notice was "directed" and 
"delivered" to the office of the county clerk. 
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Second, defendants' analysis wholly ignores the fact that the Kane County 
Attorney expressly instructed to whom all correspondence should be sent. The 
defendants had already received written confirmation that that designee already possessed 
the notice of claim. 
The County Attorney had authority to confirm the person to act upon the 
notice of claim. The defendants in no way distinguish or rebut the statutory or case law 
foundation offered by the plaintiffs for the proposition that the county attorney acts on 
behalf of the county as an entity. See Salt Lake County Commission v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney. 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-18-l(7)(a)(1995) and 17-18-
1.5(5)(a)(1997). Instead, defendants first wrongly infer that plaintiffs rely solely on the 
Bischel1 decision, while ignoring the other authority offered by the plaintiffs. Second, 
defendants fail to recognize the proposition in Bischel for which the case was cited: 
Considering the duties and authority delegated to the county attorney's 
office, it is evident that the governmental entity entrusted with investigating 
and settling or defending the claim received the requisite notice well within 
the one year period imposed by the statute. 
Bischel 907 P.2d at 278. This exact conclusion can be found in the present case. 
Defendants have never claimed the notice was not given within the one year period and 
'Bischel v. Merritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995). 
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that the defendants acted on that notice. The defendants have suffered no prejudice, and 
the defendants will suffer no prejudice if this matter is remanded. 
Instead of addressing plaintiffs' arguments regarding the authority of the county 
attorney to act on behalf of the county as an entity, defendants attempt to provide case law 
in their favor, but ignore the most elementary distinction between the facts ofBellonio v. 
Salt Lake City Corp.,2 and the present factual scenario. In Bellonkx the notice was sent to 
the airport attorney, an attorney representing the entity of the airport, and not to the city 
attorney or any person representing the city, where the city was the entity concerned. In 
other words, the Bellonio case presents a scenario where no notice was given to the 
proper entity. Thereby, defendants missed the critical distinction in Bellonio, where the 
court found that the airport attorney was not the agent for the city. 
In contrast, in the present circumstances the county attorney is the agent of the 
county. Here, that county attorney instructed that all communication and correspondence 
should go through its attorneys. Those same attorneys had already acknowledged 
possession and receipt of the notice of claim. Most importantly, the correct entity had 
received and acted upon the notice. 
A similar distinction can be found in the recent case of Thimmes v. Utah State 
2911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996). 
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University, 2001 UT App 93, 417 Utah Adv. Rep., where the Utah Court of Appeals 
refused to apply the principles ofBischel where the plaintiff could not even name a 
person who had given them direction regarding notices of claim. In contrast, in the 
present circumstances the documentary evidence is clearly before this court that the 
county attorney for Kane county was the party who had the authority to tell the plaintiffs 
where to direction their communication.3 
Defendants have in no wise argued that Kane County did not have an opportunity 
to settle this matter without the expense of litigation. Nor have the defendants argued that 
the notices were untimely or otherwise defective. In fact, the attorneys for Kane county 
acted upon the notices of claim. Thus, the defendants cannot argue that the purposes of 
the notice of claim statutes have not been fulfilled. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 
1999UT36,U20,977P.2dl201. 
Conspicuously absent from the defendants' analysis is any argument that they have 
been prejudiced in any way. In the present circumstances, addressing the notices to the 
county commissioners in no way inhibited the settlement of plaintiffs' claims without 
resort to litigation. The county attorney turned the entire matter over to its insurance 
3
 The Thimmes case is attached to defendants' brief. Plaintiffs would note that 
they believe it is inappropriate for case law to be attached to a brief which has counsel's 
notations within the body of the opinion. 
5 
company, which in turn turned it over to its current attorneys, months before any notice of 
claim was required. Those attorneys followed up on receiving supplemental information 
regarding the claim. Thus, once the Kane county attorney directed that all further 
communication and correspondence go through Ms. Hutton, no further claim or notice 
was required. 
The county attorney had the authority, real or apparent, to confirm the person to 
possess and act on the notice of claim. Defendants in the present matter have in no wise 
distinguished the case law, or more importantly, the statutory provisions which provide 
that the county attorney is the legal advisor of the county and must act upon all claims 
against the county. In the present circumstances, Kane County Attorney, Mr. Winchester 
clearly had the statutory authority to direct the plaintiffs that all communication and 
correspondence should go to Ms. Hutton. This court has unequivocally held that the 
county attorney represents the entity of the county. Salt Lake Count Commission v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney. 1999 UT 73,^ 17 and 19, 1985 P.2d 899. 
Defendants claim that the holding of Brittain v. State by and through Utah Dept. of 
Employ., 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) has no application to the present case. Once 
again, defendants ignore the proposition for which Brittain was offered. First, Brittain 
explained the purposes of the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
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that is, to "afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and 
timely investigation" and "to arrive at a timely settlement if appropriate" to avoid the 
expenses of litigation. Brittam, 882 P.2d at 671. Again, there is no question but that 
those purposes have been fulfilled in the present case. 
Further, Brittain essentially allowed for substantial compliance with the statutory 
notice requirements. The Brittain court's holding, in the final analysis, was that the 
plaintiff had fulfilled the requirements of the notice statute because way the plaintiff had 
viewed the statute was reasonable. In the present case, the purposes of the statute were 
fulfilled and the plaintiffs acted reasonably in relying upon the representations of the 
Kane County attorney and the written confirmation of the attorneys hired for Kane 
County that they possessed the notices. 
Finally, it is hardly inappropriate for the plaintiffs to cite the case of Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) when reviewing the purposes of the 
Governmental Immunity Act where this and other Utah appellate courts have cited the 
case for similar purposes. See Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 
1998); Bellonio. 911 P.2d at 1297; Bischel. 907 P.2d at 278; Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671. 
Further, while the Stahl court did not rest its opinion on the doctrine of estoppel, the court 
did review the facts and circumstances of the case in that light. Lastly, plaintiffs maintain 
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that the distinction between the Transit Act and the Governmental Immunity Act does not 
survive scrutiny. Both statutes provide that notice "shall" be filed within a proscribed 
period. This court should take this opportunity to adopt a common standard for such 
notice requirements. 
Because the facts and circumstances of this case present a scenario where the 
purposes of the notice statute have been fully met, and circumstances exist upon which 
the plaintiffs reasonably relied that they had fulfilled the notice requirements, the trial 
court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss must be reversed. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED FURTHER 
DISCOVERY 
The defendants in this matter have failed completely to rebut the arguments of the 
plaintiffs regarding the trial court's failure to allow further discovery pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (f). Instead, the defendants simply state the question before 
the court was one of jurisdiction, no discovery could be allowed. However, defendants' 
analysis fails to recognize that once they filed an affidavit with their motion it became a 
motion more properly treated under Rule 56. As previously stated in plaintiffs' brief, 
when matters outside the pleadings are considered, any motion under Rule 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is more properly treated as one for summary judgment under 
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Rule 56. Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). Defendants simply 
wish to ignore this court's decision in Shunk v. State. 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996). In 
Shunk, this court reviewed a governmental immunity case where matters were examined 
outside the pleadings and held that the motion was decided under Rule 56. 
The defendants have in no wise proffered any case law or analysis whatsoever that 
would indicate that no discovery should be allowed. Even though this court can rest its 
decision to reverse the trial court in this regard squarely upon the rules themselves and 
prior precedent, this court should also take the opportunity to expressly hold that on issues 
of jurisdiction, in order to give the parties a truly fair day in court, and thereby ensure due 
process, the parties should be allowed to conduct discovery in order to litigate the 
jurisdictional issues. Absent such an opportunity, the courts are simply inviting situations 
where a record is incomplete as to the true facts of the matter. 
It would truly be a hollow realm of jurisprudence for this court to recognize that 
governmental entities can be estopped from claiming a defect in notice and at the same 
time sustain a trial court in abrogating the rights of plaintiffs to conduct any discovery 
into the facts which might plainly exhibit a clear basis for estoppel to apply. In the 
present case, the record already provides a basis for reversal. One must only wonder at 
what further information may have been garnered had discovery been allowed. 
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IIL ONLY SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED 
AS TO THE DELIVERY OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
There is no dispute in the present matter that a notice of claim was presented 
months before it would have been due and delivered to Kane County by way of the Kane 
County Clerk's office. Ms. Holly Ramsay of the county clerk's office signed for the 
certified letters enclosing the notice of claims. It is further undisputed that the defendants 
acted upon these notices of claim: a county commissioner contacted plaintiffs counsel, 
the county attorney wrote to plaintiffs counsel acknowledging possession of the notices 
of claim, and the attorneys hired for Kane County likewise acknowledged possession of 
the notices of claim and requested further information. Defendants in no wise argue to 
this court that strict compliance is the best rule of the State of Utah. Instead, the sole 
argument of the defendants is that strict compliance has been the rule of law for some 
time, should therefore be honored as tradition, and should therefore be rashly enforced in 
the present circumstances. 
However, as outlined in plaintiffs' principle brief, the strict compliance 
requirement in Utah is judicially created. In fact, plaintiffs have pointed out that this 
court accepted substantial compliance as the standard prior to its setting forth the strict 
compliance standard. Spencer v. Salt Lake City. 17 Utah 2d 362 , 412 P.2d 449 (1966). 
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Since this is the court which invented the strict compliance standard for the State of Utah, 
this court can remedy the harsh results that standard creates by adopting the substantial 
compliance standard, as long as the notice of claim is found to be timely. 
Citizens should be able to bring claims against the government where the 
government or its agents have acted negligently. While limitations must be placed on 
meritorious claims, those limitations can reasonably be fulfilled by requiring strict 
compliance with the timing provisions of the statute, but allowing for substantial 
compliance as to the form of the notice and its delivery. After all, a plaintiff must meet 
two effective statutes of limitation to bring a claim; first, the notice of claim must be 
timely, and second the lawsuit itself must be filed within a year of the denial, express or 
implied, of the claim. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-14 (1965) and 63-30-15(2)(1987). 
The factual background of this case shows how a better standard leads to more just 
results. This court can continue to enforce the time requirements of the notice. There 
must be a deadline somewhere in order for stability to be obtained. Likewise, this court 
can continue to expect litigants to give notice to the appropriate entity. Clearly, an entity 
cannot act upon a notice it never receives. However, where the correct entity timely 
receives the notice and is afforded an opportunity to act thereon, the standard of 
substantial compliance should be adopted. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Kane County, the entity concerned, received the notice of claim, and more 
particularly, because the person whom the county attorney designated to be the proper 
recipient for the notice of claim did in fact possess the notice of claim, the trial court's 
decision to dismiss the matter must be reversed. Further, for the other reasons outlined in 
plaintiffs' brief, the trial court's conclusion must be reversed and the matter be remanded 
for trial. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 21st day of May, 2001. 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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